People v. Butler by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Butler 64 Cal.2d 842 (1966).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/632
842 PEOPLE v. BUTLER [64 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 9733. In Bank. July 11, 1966.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD M. 
BUTLER et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Objections: Evidence 
-Obtained by Unlawful Seiznre: Searches and Seizures 
-Bemedies.-Pen. Code, §§ 1539 and 1540, do not create an 
exception to the rule that a motion raising the issue that 
.evidence was illegally obtained is not required before objecting 
at the trial to introduction of illegally obtained evidence j an 
accused may attack the validity of a search warrant at the 
preliminary hearing and at the trial regardless of whether he 
attacked it under §§ 1539 and 1540. (Disapproving anything to 
the contrary in People v. Keener, 55 Ca1.2d 714 [12 Cal.Rptr. 
859, 361 P.2d 587] j People v. Marion, 197 Cal.App.2d 835 [18 
Cal.Rptr. "219] j People v. Prieto, 191 Cal.App.2d 62 [12 Cal. 
Rptr. 577]; People v. Dosier, 180 Cal.App.2d 436 [4 Cal.Rptr. 
309]; People v. Lep'Ur, 175 Cal.App.2d 798 [346 P.2d 914]; 
People v. Nelson, 171 Cal.App.2d 356 [340 P.2d 718]; People v. 
Phillips, 163 Cal.App.2d 541 [329 P.2d 621]; People v. Thorn-
ton, 161 Cal.App.2d 718 [327 P.2d 161]; .Arata v. Superior 
Oourt,153 Cal.App.2d 767 [315 P.2d 473].) 
[2] Searches ·a.nd Seizures-Remedies.-The Legislature's purpose 
in enacting Pen. Code, §§ 1539 and 1540, was to afford the 
person from whom property was wrongfully seized an expedi-
tious remedy for its recovery, not to regulate the procedure for 
objecting to introduction of evidence in criminal trials. 
[3] Criminal Law - Preliminary Proceedings - Objections: Evi-
dence-Obtained by Unlawful Seizure.-Defendant is allowed 
to object for the first time at the preliminary hearing or at the 
trial to introduction of evidence illegally obtained without a 
warrant, and where the evidence was obtained under a search 
warrant, there is no reason to adopt a different rule. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County granting probation following narcotics convictions. 
John G. Barnes, Judge. Reversed. 
Alton I. Leib for Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ 396). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 168, 413.5(3); 
Searches and Seizures, § 38; [2] Searches and Seizures, § 38; [3] 
Criminal Law, §§ 168,413.5(1). 
) 
July 1966] PEOPLE v. BUTLER 
[64 C.2d 842: 52 Cal.Rptr ... 415 P.2d 119] 
843 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and William. L. Zessar, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and ;Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants appeal from orders granting 
them probation after they were convicted of possessing mari-
juana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11530. 
They contend that the trial court erred in not permitting them 
to show that evidence introduced at their trial was obtained by 
an illegal search and seizure. 
On October 25, 1963, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff 
Charles Vaughn obtained a warrant to search defendants' 
home and a,utomobile. It was issued on the basis of his affidavit 
that he had information from a reliable confidential informer 
of the use of narcotics at the described premises. The search 
uncovered various items of evidence that led to defendants' 
arrest and subsequent conviction~ 
At the preliminary hearing, defendants elicited testimony 
from Deputy Sheriff Vaughn that on three or four occasions 
he had crawled und.er their residence and looked through 
cracks in the floor. He was then asked: "Q. Now, sir, you are 
the one who made the application to Judge Farl~ for the 
search warrant, is that correct T A. Yes, sir. Q. And you 
made that application on the basis of the information you had 
obtained while underneath the premises at 1788 Orange Grove 
on those three or four previous occasions prior to January 25, 
is that correct' MR. COURTNEY [Deputy District Attorney] : 
Just a minute, Officer. I will object to the question. Appar-
ently Counsel is trying to go behind the search warrant and 
this is not the proper procedure for it. I will object to the 
question on those grounds, Your Honor." 
The committing magistrate sustained the objection on the 
ground that defendants' failure to pursue the remedy pro-
vided by Penal Code sections 1539-1540 precluded them from 
attacking the warrant. At the trial defendants made a motion 
for a hearing to determine the facts underlying the issuance of 
the warrant. The trial court denied the motion. 
[1] In People v. Berger (1955) 44 Cal.2d 459, 464 [282 
P .2d 509], we rejected the federal rule that ordinarily the 
issue as to whether evidence was illegally obtained must be 
raised by motion before trial and held that such a motion is 
not required before an objection can be made at the trial to the 
introduction of illegally obtained evidence. Several decisions 
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rule of the Berger case does not apply when a search and 
seizure are made under a search warrant valid on its face and 
that in such cases the defendant's remedy is to attack the 
warrant uuder Penal Code sections 1539-1540. (People v. Mar-
ion (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 835, 838-839 [18 Cal.Rptr. 219]; 
People v. Prieto (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 62, 66-67 [12 Cal. 
Rptr. 577] ; People v. Dosier (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 436, 439-
440 [4 Cal.Rptr. 309] ; People v. Lepur (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 
798, 802 [346 P.2d 914] ; People v. Nelson (1959) 171 Cal. 
App.2d 356, 360 [340 P.2d 718] ; People v. Phillips (1958) 163 
Cal.App.2d 541, 545 [329 P.2d 621]; People v. Thornton 
(1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 718, 721 [327 P.2d 161]; Arata v. 
Superior Court (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 767, 770 [315 P.2d 
473] .) 
Penal Code sections 1539-15401 provide that if the grounds 
for issuance .of the warrant are controverted, a hearing shall 
be held, and if the magistrate finds that there is no probable 
cause for believing the grounds on which the warrant was 
issued, or if the property taken was uot that described in the 
warrant, the magistrate must restore the property to the per-
son from whom it was taken. In People v. Keener (1961) 55 
Cal.2d 714, 719-720 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587], we held 
that a magistrate's ruling sustaining a warrant in a proceed-
ing under Penal Code sections 1539-1540 is not final and that 
the defendant may thereafter renew his attack on the warrant 
at the preliminary hearing and at the trial. Since the defend-
ants in the Keener case had attacked the warrant under sec-
tions 1539 and 1540 before attacking it at the preliminary 
hearing, it was unnecessary to decide whether a warrant valid 
on its face must be attacked under those sections before an 
objection can be made at the preliminary hearing or at the 
trial to the introduction of evidence obtained under the war-
rant. We have concluded that sections 1539 and 1540 do not 
create an exception to the rule of the Berger case and that a 
rlefendant may therefore attack the validity of a warrant at 
the preliminary hearing and at the trial whether or not he 
lSection 1539 provides: "If the grounds on which the warrant was 
issued be controverted, he must proceed to take testimony in relation 
thereto, and the testimony of each witness must be reduced to writing 
:nul authenticated in the manner prescribed in section eight hundred and 
sixty-nine_ " 
Section 1540 provides: "If it appears that the property taken is not 
the same as that described in the warrant, or there is no probable cause 
for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was 
issued, the magistrate must cause it to be restored to the pet"son from 
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attacked it under sections 1539 and 1540. Anything to the 
contrary in the foregoing decisions of the District Courts of 
Appeal or in the Keener case is disapproved. 
[2] Sections 1539 and 1540 were enacted in 1872, 83 years 
before the exclusionary rule was adopted in People v. Cahan 
(1955) 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513]. Accord-
ingly, the Legislature's purpose in enacting those sections was 
not to regulate the procedure for objecting to the introduction 
of evidence in criminal trials but to afford the person from 
whom property was wrongfully seized an expeditious remedy 
for its recovery. (See Aday v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal. 
2d 789,800 [13 Cal.Rptr. 415,362 P.2d 47].) 
Moreover, the remedy provided by sections 1539 and 1540 
would serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
fitfully at best. It would not preclude an officer from testifying 
to what he saw in the course of a search under an invalid 
warrant or from using information obtained in such a search 
to secure other evidence. (See PeopZe v. Berger, supra, 44 Cal. 
2d 459, 462; People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 374, 378-379 
[303 P.2d 721].) It would afford no relief to a defendant from 
whom the property was not taken. (See People v. Martin 
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 755, 759-761 [290 P.2d 855]; Jones v. United 
States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 260-267 [80 S.Ot. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 
697, 78 A.L.R.2d 233].) It would afford no relief when the 
property is contraband, which cannot be returned. (See Aday 
v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.2d 789, 799-800.) Since the 
state must afford to •• every defendant a full and fair opportu-
nity to secure an adjudication of all claimed deprivations of 
his constitutional rights in the securing of the evidence offered 
against him at the trial" (In re Sterling (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 
486,488 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205,407 P.2d 5]; see Townsend v. Sain, 
372 U.S. 293, 312-318 [83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770]), a require-
ment that he must exhaust the remedy under sections 1539-
1540 would entail either a broadening of the remedy beyond 
the statutory terms or the adoption of exceptions when the 
statutory remedy was inadequate. 
Even if sections 1539 and 1540, enacted in 1872, were now 
invoked to implement the 1955 exclusionary rule of the Cahan 
case, difficult problems of timing would arise. Thus, if a de-
fendant were excusably ignorant until the trial of facts to 
controvert "the grounds on which the warrant was issued" 
(Pen. Code, § 1539), it would be necessary either to postpone 
. the trial until the validity of the warrant could be determined 
by the magistrate who issued it or to waive the requirement 
) 
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that the warrant first be attacked before him. Since any deci-
sion the magistrate might reach would be subject to relitiga-
tion at the trial (People v. Keener, supra, 55 Cal2d 714, 719-
720), it would be pointless to delay the trial so that the valid-
ity of the warrant ~ould be litigated twice. Even if the defend-
ant knew or should have known of grounds for attacking the 
warrant at some time before trial, it would be a needless com-
plication to require an adjudication of the time when he could 
reasonably have been expected to proceed· before the magis-
trate and whether that time was so near the time set for tr-ial 
that he should be excused from proceeding before the magis-
trate. 
[3] The rule allowing the defendant to object for the first 
time at the preliminary hearing or at the trial to the introduc-
tion of evidence illegally obtained without a warrant has 
proved workable: We see no reason to adopt a dUferent rule 
merely because evidence was obtained under a warrant. As we 
pointed out in People v. Berger, supra, 44 Cal2d 459, 464: 
"Ordinarily preliminary questions of fact that govern the 
admissibility of evidence are determined by the trial court 
when objection is made to the introduction of the evidence at 
trial, and the. eJl;perience of tIle federal courts indicates that 
there are no compelling reasons why an exception to the 
general rule should be made in the case of illegally obtained 
evidence. [Citations.] The issues involved will ordinarily be no 
more time-consuming or complicated than those presented to 
the trial court when it must rule, for example, on the admis-
sibility of confessions, business records, or evidence claimed to 
be privileged, or on the qualifications of expert or other wit-
nesses. On the other hand, a requirement that a preliminary 
motion be made to suppress the evidence would inevitably 
result in delaying the criminal trial while the motion was 
being noticed, calendared, heard, argued, and determined." 
The orders are reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., con-
curred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissent. 
The majority emphasize that sections 1539 and 1540 were 
enacted in 1872, 83 years before the exclusionary rule was 
adopted in People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal2d 434 [282 P.2d 
905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513). I fail to find that chronology particu-
larly significant. . 
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Arata v. Superior Oourt (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 767 [315 
P.2d 473], was decided two years after the Oah{ln decision, 
and this court denied a hearing. In Arata it was pointed out 
(at p. 770) that issuance of a search warrant is a judicial act 
and that "[ t] he only review of such a judicial act that is 
specifically provided by law, is the review sanctioned by sec-
tions 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code." (Italics added.) 
Section 1539 provides: "If the grounds on which the warrant 
was issued be eontroverted, [the magistrate who issued tIle 
search warrant] must proceed to take testimony .... " 
Arata has been followed by an unbroken line of cases. 
(People v. Thornton (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 718, 721 [327 
P.2d 161] ; People v. Phillips (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 541, 545 
[329 P.2d 621] ; People v. Nelson (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d a56, 
360 [340 P.2d 718] ; People v. Lepur (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 
798,802 [346 P.2d 914] ; People v. Dosier (1960) 180 Cal.App. 
2d 436, 439 [4 CalRptr. 309]; People v. Prieto (1961) 191 
Cal.App.2d 62, 66 [12 Cal.Rptr. 577]; People v. Marion 
(1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 835,838 [18 Cal.Rptr. 219].) 
I find no authority to justify overruling the foregoing post-
Cahan decisions, and I am persuaded it is inadvisable to adopt 
. a new rule. Under the majority view, a defendant who now has 
five methods of achieving the exclusion of evidence, is gratui-
tously awarded a sixth and additional procedure whenever he 
chooses to ignore or fails to first employ any of the other 
available means. As pointed out in People v. Phillips, supra, at 
page 545: "California cases indicate that, if prior to trial, 
defendant had /iesired to challenge the validity of the search 
warrant and the resulting effect of it she could have (a) made 
a motion to quash it (People v. Berger, 44 Ca1.2d 459,461 [282 
P.2d 509]); (b) petition for a writ of mandamus for the 
return of the property (People v. Berger, supra) ; (c) made a 
motion to suppress or exclude the evidence (People v. Alaniz, 
[dissenting opinion] 149 Cal.App.2d 560, 571 [309 P.2d 71], 
citing United States v. Kind, 87 F.2d 315,316) ; (d) sought a 
writ of prohibition (Willson v. Superior Oourt, 46 Ca1.2d 291 
[294 P.2d 36]). Also, defendant had certain rights under sec-
tions 1539 and 1540, Penal Code, ... " 
Arata and its progeny hold unequivocally that failure to 
pursue statutory remedies under sections 1539 and 1540 pre-
. eludes a defendant from controverting the facts slated in the 
affidavit upon which the search warrant was based. This rule is 
generally followed in other jurisdictions, with or \vithout 
comparable statutes. (E.g., see Tischler v. State (1955) 206 
848 PEOPLE v. BUTLER [64 C.2d 
Md. 386 [111 A.2d 655, 657] ; One 1949 Model Oldsmobile v. 
State (Okla. 1954) 276 P.2d 245,247; O'Brien v. State (1959) 
205 Tenn. 405 [326 S.W.2d 759, 764] ; Hernandez v. State 
(1952) 158 Tex. Crim. Rep. 296 [255 S.W.2d 219, 221] ; Goss 
v. Maryland (19,51) 198 Md. 350 [84 A.2d 57, 58] ; Mattingly 
v. Commonwealth (1949) 310 Ky. 561 [221 S.W.2d 82, 84] ; 
People v. Alvis (1930) 342 Ill. 460 [174 N.E. 527] ; Seager v. 
State (1928) 200 Ind. 579 [164 N.E. 274]; State v. Halbrook 
(1925) 311 Mo. 664 [279 S.W. 395]; State v. Seymour (1924) 
46 R.I. 257 [126 A. 755, 756]; State v. Englisk (1924) 71 
Mont. 343 [229 P. 727].) 
The majority suggest that sections 1539 and 1540 were de-
signed "not to regulate the procedure for objecting to the 
introduction of evidence in criminal trials but to afford the 
person from whom property was wrongfulJy seized an expedi-
tious remedy for its recovery." As recently as 1961 thia con-
tention was rejected in People v Prieto, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d 
62, at page 67, in which Mr. Justice Tobriner noted that al-
though "as an original proposition, we might have doubted 
whether the language of the sections literally applied to an 
attempt of a defendant to suppress the evidence, rather than 
to regain it, we think the cases have clearly disposed of the 
issue. . . . A' belated change in the interpretation might well 
produce more confusion than clarification." On May 31, 1961, 
this court denied a hearing in Prieto. 
Again in People v. Marion (1961) supra, 197 Cal.App.2d 
835, 838, it was categorically asserted that the "rule is well 
established that the issuance of a search warrant is a judicial 
act and that the only review of such an act is that sanctioned 
by sections 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code. '.' Not only did 
this court deny a hearing in Marion on February 7, 1962, but 
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (370 U.S. 
961). 
People v. Keener (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 714 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 
361 P.2d 587], holds that a defendant may challenge the suffi-
ciency of the warrant at trial if he takes the required protec-
tive steps before trial, the asserted reason being that an appeal 
will not lie from denial of a motion to quash a warrant. While 
one might quarrel with that rationale, since prohibition could 
be sought in appellate courts in lieu of an appeal, stare decisis 
compels adherence to Keener. The rule should be limited, how-
ever, to the conclusion announced (at p. 720) ; "Defendants, 
prior to the preliminary hearing, did all that could reasonably 
be expected of them to preserve their rights, and, under these 
circumstances, the adverse ruling upon the motion to quash 
-) 
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the warrant did not preclude them from subsequently raising 
at the preliminary hearing their claim that the warrant was 
defective. " 
In the instant case the defendant took no steps to preserve 
his rights. He made no motion to quash the warrant. He 
sought no writ of mandate for return or destruction of the 
property. He sought no writ of prohibition against use of the 
property at the trial. He made no motion to suppress or ex-
clude the evidence. In short, he ignored all of the possible 
alternatives suggested in People v. Phillips, supra. Not until 
the trial did he seek to determine the facts underlying the 
issuance of the warrant. 
The majority rely heavily, almost exclusively, on People v. 
Berger (1955) 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d 509]. Factually, how-
ever, Berger is inapposite, for there the defendant prior to 
trial moved before the municipal court judge who issued the 
warrant, to quash the warrant. His motion was denied, so, still 
before trial, he sought a writ of mandate in the superior court, 
directing the municipal court to return the seized property. 
This was granted, the original warrant was quashed, and the 
records were returned. The problem discussed in the Berger 
opinion arose when the prosecutor attempted to introduce into 
evidence at the trial photostats of the records that had been 
returned pursuant to the court order. Obviously that issue 
could not have been reached prior to trial. 
The majority see "no reason to adopt a different rule merely 
because evidence was obtained under a warrant." But the 
point is, as I see it, that there is and should be a marked 
difference between evidence seized with and that taken without 
a warrant. As Chief Justice Gibson wrote in Keener (1961) 
supra, 55 Ca1.2d 714, 723: "There is, of course, nothing novel 
in the view that law enforcement officials may be in a more 
favorable position where a warrant is obtained than where 
action is taken without a warrant." 
If a defendant may attack the sufficiency of the warrant at 
trial, without first following the procedures outlined in sec-
tions 1539 and 1540 and in the cases interpreting the sections, 
much of the "favorable position where a warrant is obtained" 
vanishes. My premonition is that hereafter there may be less 
frequent use of warrants by law enforcement officers, an un-
wholesome result for the administration of criminal justice. 
I would affirm the orders. 
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Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Right to Fair Trial: Judg-
ment - Sentence - Where One Count Is Defective. - Though 
defendant's prior conviction, which he denied, had not properly 
been proved and his judgment of conviction was modified to 
strike it, he was not denied due process of law and was not 
entitled to relief from the judgment as modified where he had 
waived a jury trial and was tried before a judge who could 
presumably weigh the evidence without being prejudiced by 
the charge of a prior conviction. 
Id.-Probation-Persons Eligible.-Although the fact that de-
fendant's accomplice was anned with a deadly weapon at the 
time of their robbery. made defendant guilty of first clegree 
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) , he was eligible for probation 
where he was not himself so armed (Pen. Code, § 1203). 
Habeas Corpus - Grounds for Relief - Probation. - Habeas 
corpus is a proper remedy to secure reconsideration of an 
application for probation on a corrected record where the trial 
court may have been influenced in denying probation by ·an 
erroneous finding of a prior felony conviction. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ granted 'with directions. 
Arthur A. Hernandez, in pro. per., and Burton Marks, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci 
and John T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted of first degree 
robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) in a nonjury trial on an 
information charging him with a prior felony conviction in 
Arizona. He denied the prior conviction, and evidence of it 
was admitted at the trial. (Pen. Code, § 1025.1 ) The trial 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 42; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus 
(1st ed § 66). 
MeR:. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 104, 1017; [2] 
Criminal Law, § 987; [3] Habeas Corpus, § 35. 
I"When a defendant who is charged ill the accusatory pleading with 
having suffered a previous conviction pleads either guilty or not guilty 
) 
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court found that petitioner was guilty of robbery, that the 
offense was robbery in the first degree because an accomplice 
was armed with a deadly weapon, and that petitioner had 
suffered the prior felony conviction.' It denied probation and 
sentenced petitioner to prison: On appeal the Attorney 
General conceded that the prior conviction had not been 
proved, because it could not bc determined from the Arizona 
records that the offense would have been a felony if committed 
in California. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.) The District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment to 
strike the prior conviction. (People v. Hernandez, nonpub-
lished opinion, District Court of Appeal, 2 Crim. 9864, July 7, 
1965.) We denied a petition for hearing. 
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that 
he was denied due process of law by reason of the admis-
sion of evidence of his prior conviction and that the District 
Court of Appeal should have reversed the judgment and 
remanded the case for resentencing when it found ,that the 
prior conviction had not been proved. 
[1] There is no merit in petitioner's contention that he was 
denied due process of law. Even if a jury might be u:t;lable 
under some circumstances to disregard a defendant's prior 
convictions in determining his guilt or innocence of the crime 
charged (see Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary (4th 
Cir.) 320 F.2d 179; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [848.Ct. 
1774,12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205]), the facts of this case 
preclude the granting of relief. Petitioner waived a jury trial 
and was tried before a judge, who was presumably able to 
weigh the evidence without being prejudiced by a charge of a 
prior felony conviction. (See People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 
883 [346 P.2d 22]; People v. Powell, 34 Ca1.2d 196, 204-205 
[208 P.2d 974] ; People v. Smylie, 217 Cal.App.2d 118,122 [31 
Cal.Rptr. 360].) 
of the offense chlll"ged against him, he must be asked whether he has 
Buffered Buch previous conviction. If he answers that he has, his answer 
must be entered in the minutes of the court, and must, unless withdrawn 
by consent of the court, be conclusive of the fact of his having suffered 
Buch previous conviction in all subsequent proceedings. If he answers that 
he has not, his answer must be entered in the minutes of the court, and 
the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must 
be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty, 
or in case of a plea of guilty, by a jury impaneled for that purpose, or 
by the court if a jury is waived. The refusal of the defendant to answer 
is equivalent to a denial that he has suffered such previous conviction. 
In case the defendant pleads not guilty, and answers that he has suffered 
the previous conviction, the charge of the previous conviction must not 
be read ,to the jury, nor alluded to on the trial." 
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[2] Petitioner's second contention, however, is well taken. 
The third paragraph of section 1203 of the Penal Code provides 
that, "except in unusual cases where the interest of justice 
demands a departure from the declared policy, no judge shall 
grant probation to any person who shall have been convicted 
of robbery, burglary or arson, and who at the time of the 
perpetration of said crime or any of them or at the time of his 
arrest was himself armed with a deadly weapon (unless at the 
time he had a lawful right to carry the same), ... nor to any 
such person unless the court shall be satisfied that he has never 
been previously convicted of a felony in this state nor previ-
ously convicted in any other place of a public offense which 
would have been a felony if committed in this state." (Italics 
added.) Although the fact that petitioner's accomplice was 
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery made 
petitioner guilty of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) , 
it did not affect 'his eligibility for probation since he was not 
"himself" so armed. (People v. Perkins, 37 Ca1.2d 62, 64 [230 
P.2d 353].) [3] The finding of the prior felony convic-
tion, however, brought petitioner withi~ the limitation on the 
granting of probation set forth in section 1203 and might have 
influenced the trial court to deny his application for proba-
tion. If a trial court might have been influenced in deny-
ing probation by an erroneous finding of a prior felony 
conviction, habeas corpus is a proper remedy to secure recon-
sideration of the application for probation upon a corrected 
record. (In re Bartges, 44 Cal.2d 241, 247 [282 P.2d 47] ; see 
People v. Morton, 41 Cal.2d 536, 545 [261 P.2d 523].) , 
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted, and the 
District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. 
Three, is directed to recall its remittitur in People v. Hernan-
dez, 2 Crim. 9864, to vacate its decision, and to reverse the 
judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for 
the sole purpose of permitting the trial judge to determine 
whether probation should be granted upon the corrected 
record. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
